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Since the result of the 2016 referendum, Brexit has been an unpredictable democratic adventure, the finale
of which remains unclear. This year, in the final days of March, parliamentarians seized control of the order
paper from the Government and held their own indicative votes in an attempt to break the deadlock. In
this paper we analyse the results of this unusual cardinal ballot. We express the various motions in terms of
‘how much Brexit’ they deliver, and employ Monte Carlo in an attempt to determine this from the data. We
find solutions which reproduce our intuitive understanding of the debate. Finally, we construct hypothetical
ordinal ballots for the various Brexit scenarios, using three different processes. The results suggest that the
Government would be more successful taking a softer position, and we quantify this. Additionally, there is
some discussion of how tactical voting might manifest itself in the event of such an exercise.
I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
Some years ago now, the Prime Minister of the day
was elected on a manifesto to renegotiate Britain’s rela-
tionship with Europe and then hold a referendum on the
outcome of those negotiations. Although the political
class was in favour of maintaining membership, signifi-
cant parts of the Prime Minister’s party took the con-
trary position. As a result, cabinet collective responsibil-
ity was suspended, so those aforementioned individuals
who were also members of the Government could publicly
campaign against its official position. This description
of the 1975 referendum on whether the UK should re-
main in the European Common Market could, of course,
equally apply to the 2016 referendum on the United King-
dom’s European Union (EU) membership. Indeed, many
of the democratic episodes which mark the United King-
dom’s relationship with the EU have a repetitive flavour.
In 1993 a Labour amendment to the Treaty of Maas-
trict (Social Protocol) resulted in a tie,1 which required
Speaker Boothroyd to cast her deciding vote with the
Noes.2 In 2019, Speaker Bercow likewise cast his vote
with the Noes to defeat a motion which sought to hold
a 3rd round of indicative votes on Brexit. In this pa-
per, we will examine the results of the first round of that
rather unusual process, in a period which has gone rather
further than merely repeating history.
The 1975 referendum went the ‘right’ way for Harold
Wilson. In the 2016 recapitulation, David Cameron was
not so fortunate: the following day he resigned with im-
mediate effect. The resignation of the Prime Minister
triggered a leadership contest within the Conservative
Party. The favourite, Boris Johnson – who had backed
the campaign to leave the EU after a considerable amount
of drama3 – withdrew before the first round following a
political bushwhacking from his close ally Michael Gove.
The purportedly4 Remain-supporting member for Maid-
enhead cruised to victory.
a)Electronic mail: tes36@cam.ac.uk
For quite some time afterwards, much of the com-
mentary indulged itself in speculation as to what ‘kind
of Brexit’ the Government would negotiate.5–7 A hard
Brexit, or a soft Brexit? For a long time there was noth-
ing more substantive from Downing Street than tauto-
logical statements in the vein of ‘Brexit means Brexit’.
It was not until the 12th of June 2018 that the white pa-
per known as the ‘Chequers Plan’ was released. Within a
month, the Brexit Secretary David Davis and the Foreign
Secretary Boris Johnson had resigned in protest. In the
meantime, the Prime Minister (after explicitly stating
she had no intention of doing so) called a snap election
which resulted in the loss of the Conservative majority.
At the time of writing, the Conservatives remain a minor-
ity government, supported by a confidence-and-supply
arrangement with the Eurosceptic Democractic Unionist
Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland. In spite of this, the
negotiators kept calm and carried on. At the Cabinet of
the 14th of November 2018 the ‘Draft Withdrawal Agree-
ment’ was debated. The Brexit Secretary Dominic Raab
and Work and Pensions Secretary Esther McVey resigned
over it. Again, in spite of this,“May’s Deal” was jointly
agreed with the EU and tabled to be ratified by parlia-
ment – something that the Government had argued was
unnecessary, but the Supreme Court found otherwise.8
The last major event antecedent to the ratification vote
was an humble address. The Government was required
to publish its legal advice on “May’s Deal”. Although
the motion passed, the documents were not immediately
forthcoming. As a result, a vote to hold the Govern-
ment in contempt of Parliament carried by 311 to 293.10
Constitutionally unprecedented, they had now gone fur-
ther than repeating history. In the wake of this defeat,
the vote on ratification was surreptitiously delayed. This
prompted votes of no confidence: first within the Con-
servative Party, and then within the House of Commons
itself. Both failed.
“May’s Deal” would be voted on for the first time on
the 15th January 2019. It went down by 202 ayes to 432
noes, the largest defeat of a government motion. Ever.
A month later, on St. Valentine’s Day, the Government
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X
iv
:1
90
5.
12
10
9v
2 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  3
 Ju
n 2
01
9
2FIG. 1. Graphic displaying the party political makeup (see the colour key) for each of the indicative votes of the ayes, noes,
and those who abstained. As the reader will no doubt be aware, no motion gained a majority. N.B. ‘Standstill transition’ is
“Planned No Deal” in the language of Table I. Reproduced from Ref. 9 under the CC BY-NC licence.a
a https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/legalcode
Letter Official Name Nickname Colour
B No Deal No Deal blue
O
Contingent Preferential
Arrangements
Planned No Deal orange
H EFTA and EEA Norway green
Z / May’s Deal red
D Common Market 2.0 Norway+ purple
J Customs Union Customs Union brown
K
Labour’s Alternative
Plan
Customs Union+ pink
M
Confirmatory Public
Vote
Public Vote silver
L
Revoke To Avoid No
Deal
Revoke Article 50 gold
TABLE I. A list of the eight amendments, with their cor-
responding letter, the nickname with which they shall be re-
ferred to, and their corresponding colour-coding in the various
figures that follow. The Government’s Withdrawal Agree-
ment is also included for completeness, and given a letter-
reference of ‘Z’.
was again defeated on a motion in support of their ne-
gotiating strategy. Another month later, on the 12th of
March, “May’s Deal” returned to the Order Paper, re-
inforced by “meaningful legal assurances” from Brussels.
It secured 40 more ayes, but still went down as one of the
most brutal defeats on record. Unbowed, the Prime Min-
ister secured a technical extension to the Brexit deadline,
which at this point was the 29th of March, in order to ta-
ble a 3rd vote. It was at this point that a cross-bench
group of MPs under Sir Oliver Letwin amended a Writ-
ten Statement to temporarily suspend standing orders
such that control of the Order Paper was wrested from
the Government.
Under Letwin et al., a set of of non-binding motions
were collectively debated. Each motion was put to a de-
ferred division and voted on in the normal way. They are
listed in Table I. For clarity, the motions will be referred
to by their nicknames enclosed in quotation marks. As I
am sure the reader is aware, no motion received a major-
ity. While a second round of voting was carried out, it
too failed to reach a consensus; it will not be analysed in
this paper. It stands to reason that given that MPs and
pundits were confident the first round of voting would
not return a clear consensus, the data should be a good
indicator of preference. Surprisingly, I could find only
one analysis9 (see Fig. 1) of the unprecedented dataset
generated by the indicative votes process.
3II. REPRESENTING THESE DATA
The first thing to do is come up with a good represen-
tation of the data. The most obvious way of doing this
is the for/against split (by party) of every deal as seen in
Fig. 1. We would like to go further, and be able to see in-
formation about each individual MP. Each has their own
voting record, and these could be quite interesting. It is
known that some MPs chose to plumper vote: vote for a
single option. Some MPs voted no to everything. Some
voted in favour of many things. Furthermore, we know
that some amendments (henceforth referred to as can-
didate policies or candidates for short) were considered
more similar in terms of their outcome than others. For
example, “Customs Union+” and “Public Vote” are both
Labour Party policy; it would not make a lot of sense
if policies seen as consistent (at least by Labour) were
viewed as leading to vastly different outcomes. There
is therefore some sense of a ‘degree of Brexit’: the ex-
tent to which a candidate advocates moving away from
the EU. We shall refer to this as hardness. To reduce
the debate to this one measure would be a single-axis
projection. A familiar single-axis would be the common
parlance of left- and right-wing. To say that someone
is ‘right-wing’ (aside from revealing your political defini-
tion of the center) is to reduce all their politics to a single
value. Moreover, this does not always represent the same
axis over time, even for a fixed set of possibilities in the
larger space (where all one’s policy positions are judged
on their own axis).
For example, in postwar Britain there was an economic
consensus that the state would play a central role in the
economy, and the debate was as to the extent to which
Keynesian stimulus should be applied. Roughly speak-
ing. With the rise of Thatcherism, there was a shift in
what was considered to be acceptable (often referred to
as the Overton window). The role of the state was dras-
tically reduced, and so was spending. Someone who was
considered right-wing during the postwar period would,
having not changed their position, be considered left-
wing under Thatcher. In the neoliberal hellscape we now
exist in, private markets are taken as given, while the
left-right debate focuses once again on the degree of pub-
lic spending.11 That same individual, having not moved
in 50 years is, upon being projected all the way onto
the neoliberal axis, once again right-wing. This is shown
schematically in Fig. 2.
To perform this single-axis projection, we first have to
decide on a numerical hardness value for each candidate.
To begin with we shall make the simplest assignment:
labelling the entries in Table I in integer steps from -4 to
4. This spacing is not going to be optimal. Furthermore,
the ordering is (at this point) entirely an opinion based
on my subjective understanding of the debate. In
Sec. III I shall try to address these shortcomings. In
any case, given a hardness set for the candidates we can
calculate each MP’s mean hardness value, by averaging
over their voting record. We shall count votes aye as 1,
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FIG. 2. Schematic representation of how multidimensional
data are represented by a single axis. The arrow shows how
the projection of a point in the grey set (postwar period)
translates onto the red axis (New Labour). The blue rep-
resents the Thatcher period. The figure is intended to be
illustrative. The scatter of the points and the parameters of
the lines are not meant to be quantitative representations of
the historical details, mostly because I have forgotten them.
abstentions as 12 , and votes no as 0. This will categorise
each MP on the Brexit axis: a score of -4 means an
extremist Brexiteer, while a score of +4 indicates an
extremist Remaineur. For intermediary values, however,
several different voting patterns can return the same
average hardness. Casting votes symmetrically about
a candidate will look the same as voting only for
that candidate. We want to be able to visualise this
difference, so we will also assign each MP a score based
on the variance of their voting record: Someone with a
spread of 0 is a true ideologue, willing to tolerate only
a single candidate; someone with a high spread is a
pragmatist. We will discuss tactical voting later, but
in this section we will subsume it into our definitions:
the plumper votes for “No Deal” are not seen in a
tactical light, but rather as the true expression of those
MPs’ distaste for any other option. In the Appendix,
Fig. 15 shows these voting data before any manipulation.
There are two major problems to be immediately ad-
dressed. Firstly, the Cabinet, Sinn Fe´in, the Speaker
and his Deputies, and 1 SNP MP, are considered to have
abstained on all options, appearing centrally with (iron-
ically) a high degree of pragmatism. For now we will
simply remove these MPs from the set. Secondly, there
are a large number of MPs who voted no to every option:
32 of them Conservatives, 1 Independent, and 1 Labour.
We currently know nothing about them. There are two
reasons I can think of for their doing this:
• They hold the whole issue of Brexit in contempt
and refuse to participate.
4−4 −2 0 2 4
← Brexiteer Remaineur →
0.0
1.3
2.6
←
Id
eo
lo
gu
e
P
ra
gm
at
is
t
→
FIG. 3. MPs are represented by circles of random radius and coloured according to their party at the time, as in Fig. 1. N.B.
all independents are in purple, whether or not they aligned with The Independent Group (TIG). Points in the blank areas on
the left and right of the main distribution are (generally) not representable by any possible ballot paper. Labour MP Stephen
Hepburn is not visible as he voted no to all options and to “May’s Deal” (on all three occassions). Huw Merriman voted for
“No Deal” and “Public Vote”, as such he has a variance of 2.87 and has been excluded for clarity. The stars represent (from
-4 to +4): Marcus Fysh, George Eustice, Chris Skidmore, Oliver Letwin, Antoinette Sandbach, Jeremy Corbyn, Rosie Cooper,
Joanna Cherry, and Caroline Lucas.
• They are “May’s Deal” ideologues, but were unable
to express their view due to the form of the ballot
paper.
That the lack of “May’s Deal” from the ballot paper is
causing more people to appear as pathologically ideolog-
ical than in reality exist is concerning for our interpreta-
tion. To resolve this, I propose that we include data from
the votes on the United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the
European Union (i.e. “May’s Deal”). This data is obvi-
ously somewhat tarnished by the imposition of whipping.
However, the whip was somewhat ineffectual, at least on
the Conservative side. I have therefore included the av-
erage of the first two votes (which were very similar, but
help separate the different MPs currently sitting at (-4,0)
into different groups, see Fig. 12) for each MP.
Having done this, the final values are displayed in
Fig. 3, colour-coded by political party. In the Appendix,
a breakdown of each candidate’s supporters is displayed
in Fig. 13. Here we can see that the 4 most extreme
candidates had quite narrow voting bases. “Norway”
managed to draw the broadest support from within the
Conservative Party, but failed to crack the ideological
far-left, which is ironic since those are the people who
voted Leave in the referendum (as can be seen in Fig. 14)
and it was exactly those people who originally advocated
for the Norway model (without quotes). “Norway+” and
“Customs Union” were the only candidates to draw truly
cross-bench support, as could be seen in Fig. 1. Here, the
fine-detail of exactly what kind of people voted for one
and not the other can be readily observed in the 2D rep-
resentation. Moreover, the (dis)similarity between the
support bases of various motions motivates us to find a
5better hardness set. A final comment is that the DUP
appear as only mildly left of centre, despite never voting
for “May’s Deal”, even in the third vote. This is likely
because they place considerably more value on how each
candidate will deal with the border on Ireland, and this
single-axis projection loses the information.
III. INFERENCE FROM CARDINAL PREFERENCES
The indicative votes process is different from other
votes in parliament. When we elect MPs in Britain, the
candidate who gain the most votes is duly elected; this
is known as plurality voting. In parliament itself, the
principle is the same except there are only two options:
votes to abstain are the same as not having been enti-
tled to vote at all (or indeed as voting in both lobbies).
However, once the parliamentary ‘domain’ of {aye, ab-
stain, no} is extended to consider multiple solutions at
the same time, it becomes possible to express more infor-
mation about your preferences by using the abstention.
This is known as cardinal voting. The common govern-
ment line around this period was that parliament had
to stop saying what it didn’t want (voting down “May’s
Deal”) and start saying what it did want. This was a
salient observation. This goes one step further in that it
was also possible to say what one didn’t really mind. (Al-
though when this method is actually used to determine a
winner, game-theoretic analysis demonstrates that cast-
ing abstaining votes is a dominated strategy and should
not be pursued, although of course, people are still ob-
served to pursue it.12) Indeed, at the time of the first
round of votes, Liberal Democrat MP Layla Moran ap-
peared on the BBC’s Politics Live explaining that she
interpreted the indicative vote ballot paper as asking for
her opinion on each candidate on a scale of {1, 0,−1}. As
it happens, by considering abstentions in the way I have
done, I have also adopted this interpretation and merely
shifted and rescaled it to {1, 12 , 0}.
A. Single-Peaked Preference Model
We now ask what can be gleaned from these cardi-
nal preferences by way of modelling. Specifically we are
searching for some clue as how to treat the definition of
the Brexit axis in a more quantitative and objective man-
ner. At this point we have obtained, for each MP who
did not abstain on all options, a mean and a variance.
We now posit that each MP has a position on Brexit: a
favoured hardness of Brexit that is described by the mean
of their voting record. For any other candidate, the desir-
ability of that policy is less the farther away it is from the
mean. We describe this behaviour via a Gaussian whose
variance is exactly the variance of their voting record.
We refer to these curves as logical MPs, a phrase that
should allow for no ambiguity between the real politicians
and the mathematical functions. An example is given in
Fig. 4. One observation about the resulting profile is
that it can return non-zero values for positions outside
of the Overton window. This can be interpreted without
too much difficulty. Positions to the right of “Revoke
Article 50” correspond to adopting a more integrationist
policy towards the EU than we had previously followed;
for example, 5 might correspond to adopting the Euro.
Positions to the left are a little more fanciful given how
far “No Deal” already is from our current position, but
it is still possible to conceive of policy positions which
advocate adversarial attitudes towards the EU; -5 might
be Foreign Secretary Mark Francois starting a trade war
with Spain over Gibraltar, or something equally exciting.
A further observation is that logical MPs have preference
curves that are symmetrical about the mean value. This
property is not going to be satisfied by most of the MPs
in the original set, but owing to the small size of the
data available it would be taking liberties to calculate
any higher moments. Later in this section, when we ad-
dress the definition of the Brexit axis, we will go some
way to accounting for this.
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FIG. 4. Example of a logical MP (red curve). The black
Xs represent the voting record (0, 1
2
, or 1) to each of the
proposals spaced along the x-axis. The dotted grey line is
to guide the eye. In this case the curve well-represents the
underlying data. The inclusion of the vote on “May’s Deal”
at -1 had no affect on this fit, as it was a no vote.
This rather natural way of expressing preference is
quite appealing, and so it makes sense that someone
else thought of it before me. Indeed, a cursory Google
search returns Marie Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat,
Marquis of Condorcet. My understanding is based on
Hillinger’s13 reporting of Condorcet’s model, as the orig-
inal 1785 work14 is in French, and my attempt at trans-
lating it was somewhat unreliable. Condorcet seems to
be to Thomas More as Mathematics is to Theology. Un-
fortunately, he was so clued-up that Robespierre quickly
realised he had to murder him to death. The Republic
had no need of scientists. Nevertheless, Condorcet gives
his name to a family of voting methods which seek to
solve a problem like this one by obtaining the candidate
who would defeat all others in pairwise contest. We will
return to this in the next section.
For now, we shall ask our logical MPs to take part in
what is known as a cumulative vote. We normalize each
6curve to 1, that is to say, we give each logical MP a single
vote which they may split up and distribute across the
axis in accordance with their preference for that partic-
ular hardness (our logical MPs will vote sincerely). Our
extremists assign their whole vote to a single point on the
axis (their curve is a delta function), while our pragma-
tists split their vote across many options. We then sum
over all MPs to obtain a distribution that represents, in
some sense, the support for a Brexit of each particular
hardness. We term this the popularity profile. The inte-
gral under the curve is equal to the total number of MPs
involved.
However, before we perform this exercise, we wish to
take into account the Cabinet. The Cabinet are large
enough that we cannot discount them and still draw con-
clusions about the relative strength of support between
candidates. Hopefully we can account for their hypo-
thetical behaviour by suggesting that they are, to some
extent, representative of the Conservative Party as a
whole. One obvious way to implement this would be sim-
ply to assign each and every member the average mean
and variance of all the Conservative MPs. This would
be rather suboptimal, especially given that the range
of views known to exist in the cabinet is quite broad.
At the other end of the spectrum, Philip Hammond has
suggested that a second referendum would be ‘perfectly
credible’. On the other end, after a hard week spent
not scheduling opposition days and dodging the buckets
collecting water in the dilapidated Palace of Westmin-
ster, Andrea Leadsom presumably arrives back at her
constituency home, puts on a brew, swaps into her ruby
slippers, and gets stuck-in to the latest ERG memoran-
dum.
In order to reflect these differences we will identify
characteristic groups of MPs.15 Students of secondary
school history may recall one John Snow who, knowing
quite a lot, noted during the 1854 Broad Street cholera
outbreak that the vast majority of the victims lived closer
to that street’s water pump than to any other. By
demonstrating infected water was the source, he thus
disproved the miasmatic theory of contagion, at least
for cholera. This sort of distance-based categorization
is known as a Voronoi partition. Here, we perform the
same exercise on these mean and variance data with re-
spect to the singled-out individuals in Fig. 3. That is
to say: the logical MPs are the citizens and the starred
individuals are the water pumps. The result of this is
displayed in Fig. 5 by a colour-coding, where the new set
of stars represent the average mean and variance within
each group. The members of the Cabinet may then be
distributed amongst these groups, proportional to what
fraction of the total parliamentary Conservative Party
exists in each. The results are displayed in Table II.
We are now in a position to construct the popularity
profile of Fig. 7. The distribution has three principle
peaks corresponding to: “No Deal”, “May’s Deal”, and
the “Customs Union/+” options. This was already ev-
ident by inspection. If we were to pick the most popu-
FIG. 5. Voronoi partition (on the displayed, rather than nu-
merical, norm) of Fig. 3 where the centers used in the con-
struction were the MPs highlighted in that figure. Those MPs
are listed and colour coded in Table II, below. In this figure,
the stars represent the average mean and variance of the MPs
within the corresponding cell (coloured grouping).
Voronoi Center Assignment Colour Share
Marcus Fysh (-3.46, 0.50) blue 8
George Eustice (-2.23, 1.27) orange 13
Chris Skidmore (-1.06, 0.12) red 4
Oliver Letwin (-0.62, 1.06) green 5
Antoinette Sandbach (0.46, 1.97) purple 2
Jeremy Corbyn (1.17, 1.58) brown 1
Rosie Cooper (1.50, 0.48) pink 0
Joanna Cherry (1.90, 1.28) silver 0
Caroline Lucas (3.41, 0.51) gold 0
TABLE II. A list of the MPs used in the Voronoi partition,
the average mean and variance of their resulting grouping
(the stars in Fig. 5), the colour assignment, and the num-
ber of Cabinet members expected to be in that grouping by
proportionality.
lar point it would be the peak corresponding to “May’s
Deal”. Sadly, the real candidate-space is not continuous
like this, or, in other words, the width of the peaks are
also important. To project onto the discrete (original)
space we integrate over the Brexit axis for each candi-
date such that the limits of integration are defined as
half-way between that candidate and its left/right near-
est neighbour. This means that the extreme options,
“No Deal” and “Revoke Article 50”, capture all support
to the left/right of them, respectively. Having performed
this projection, we can now compare our model values
with the real-life results of the indicative vote process.
These are the coloured and light-grey bars in Fig. 6. The
dark-grey bars are the aye-votes only, for reference. As
the figure shows, support for some options like “No Deal”
and “Customs Union+” are almost perfectly reproduced
by this model. However, some have a large degree of er-
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FIG. 6. The coloured bars represent the model data of Fig. 7 integrated according to the rule described in the text. The adjacent
light-grey bars are the original data, with abstentions scoring at 0.5, and with the sum over all the candidates normalized to
the same total as the coloured bars. The final set of dark grey bars do not include the abstentions, this is for reference. The
major difference is on the popularity of “Norway”; conclusions about the most popular options are largely unaffected.
ror, such as “May’s Deal”, “Public Vote”, and “Revoke
Article 50”. We can quantify how well the model has
performed by calculating the modulus of the vector con-
taining each of these errors. For this example the value
is 0.124 in relative units: around 12% of the votes are
mis-distributed.
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FIG. 7. Continuous popularity profile obtained from summing
over the logical MPs (grey dashed line). The groups of Fig. 5
are also displayed, and their sum is the black dotted line.
The delta-like spike around -1 is due to the “May’s Deal”
ideologues, who are assigned a minimal spread (such that their
logical MP goes to zero as it reaches the adjacent options) for
clarity. The group-average variance is even smaller than this.
The reason for performing this exotic and hypothetical
form of voting will now be explained. In the first sec-
tion, we bemoaned the fact that the Brexit axis’ spacing
was arbitrary, and its ordering subjective. To some ex-
tent, the spacing and ordering of the axis also subsumes
the issues we discussed around the Gaussian represen-
tation of the logical MPs: while they cannot have any
asymmetry, the position of the options around the peaks
can. It is now claimed that the definition of each can-
didate’s hardness is the major source of the 12% error
in the model. As far as possible, the model should be
self-consistent, since it takes parameters from the data
set and then attempts to reconstruct that same data set.
One issue that I will not be able to resolve is that of MPs
who view the candidates in a completely different order
from the majority. For example, Conservative Huw Mer-
riman voted aye to “No Deal” and “Public Vote”, appar-
ently because he has more faith in the democracy than
“No Deal” supporters.16 This will lead to a residual level
of error we cannot overcome. Nevertheless, a different
choice of hardness values for the candidates (hardness
sets) should have a lower error, and if we could find such
a set we could go some way to commenting on the ‘objec-
tive’ spacing and ordering of options. Note, it is not so
simple as to simply move, for instance, the “Revoke Ar-
ticle 50” candidate further into the large peak of support
just adjacent to it! Altering the hardness of a particular
candidate affects the means and the variances of all the
MPs who voted for it, and therefore affects both the posi-
tion and/or existence of the peak in question in addition
to the integral values of all the other candidates (both
through the altering of the popularity profile and the in-
tegration procedure which maps it onto the discrete space
of Fig. 6). We will therefore need to find such hardness
sets algorithmically.
B. Metropolis Monte Carlo Search
Without loss of generality “May’s Deal” was fixed at
-1. The domain was set to be 7 Brexit units either side
of -1, under the assumption (backed up by tests) that
sets which use larger ranges would not aid in produc-
ing meaningful orderings.17 The possible sets in the re-
sulting seven-dimensional space were then explored using
Metropolis Monte Carlo to minimize the size of the error
vector. Firstly, a long run with large moves ([-1,1] for
each candidate) and a low Metropolis multiplier (‘high
8temperature’) was performed. From this run low error
sets were selected and a second run with a smaller range
of allowed moves ([-0.1,0.1]) and a high Metropolis mul-
tiplier (4x as large, ‘low temperature’) was performed for
each. This is known as “annealing”. An example of one
set found in this way is shown in Fig. 8. An error reduc-
tion of around 5× is the best that was observed.
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FIG. 8. An example of a solution obtained by Monte Carlo.
I will take the opportunity to christen this: Self-Consistent
Heuristic Ordinal Opinion Loop Monte Carlo (SCHOOLMC).
The red dashed line marks the error of the starting set. The
red line is the ‘high temperature’ search with the larger step
size. Multiple basins can be observed. The blue line is just
one of the many ‘low temperature’ searches with the lower
step size. The black star indicates where the algorithm has
indentified a basin during the red search and therefore started
the subsequent blue search. In this case the final error (blue
dashed line) is higher than the lowest error found by the red
line, and so this solution was rejected.
Some of these sets are nonsensical, for example putting
together “Revoke Article 50” and “No Deal” far off to-
gether at an extreme of the domain. Fortunately, many
results constituted ‘sensible’ sets, in which it was mainly
the spacing from the original that had changed. By cod-
ing what it means to be ‘sensible’ into the Monte Carlo in
the form of some kind of Lagrangian, its efficiency could
be massively increased, but I was wary of imposing too
many of my own biases on the data at this stage. In any
case, with no clear winner some amount of judgement
must be employed. Certainly, more work could be done
on the algorithm in general and these data in particular.
For now we will concern ourselves with just one of these
stochastically obtained choices for each candidate’s hard-
ness. The selected set’s popularity profile is displayed in
Fig. 9, where the set itself is displayed as ticks below the
axis. In this case, one interesting change is the ordering
between “Norway+” and “May’s Deal”. We can under-
stand this particular change as follows. Firstly, they both
belong to the same peak of the total popularity distribu-
tion, and specifically are the two ‘most Brexit’ options in
that peak. “Norway+” is the more popular of the two.
It follows that “Norway+” must be further to the edge of
the cluster in order to gain the rump of the votes to the
left, since votes to the right compete with the various ‘soft
Brexit’ options. The centre cannot hold. If this troubles
the reader, perhaps because they see the broader appeal
to Labour of “Norway+” as meaning that it must be ‘less
Brexit’ than “May’s Deal”, remember that this set is not
a representation of where these candidate policies ‘actu-
ally are’ on some ‘true’ axis, but rather a suggestion of
how they appeared to the parliamentarians when they
were casting their votes. The course-grained version can
be seen in Fig 9, again with the observed data in grey
for comparison, the large reduction in error from Fig. 6
is readily observable.
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FIG. 9. Top: Continuous popularity profile (as in Fig. 7)
for the optimised set. The x-axis has been rescaled, with the
candidate’s letter references (see Table I) displayed at their
respective hardness values. “May’s Deal” and “Norway+”
have swapped in the ordering, as have “Public Vote” and
“Customs Union+”. Bottom: the corresponding discrete
popularity profile (as in Fig. 6, omitting dark-grey bars). The
model claims “Norway+” is more popular than the original
data suggest, and that “Customs Union/+” are less popular.
Several things stand out to the author. Firstly, the now
two-peaked distribution and its large separation between
“No Deal” and the other candidates is reminiscent of the
Leave-Remain split of Fig. 14. Parliament is much closer
to the Remaineur extremists than the Leave extremists.
Secondly, the set clusters options together in a way that is
appealing given the discussion in Sec. II. Thirdly, “May’s
Deal” being located within the larger peak shows it is
entirely consistent with the preferences of the majority-
Labour groupings, as the Government often suggests.
9IV. HYPOTHETICAL ORDINAL BALLOTS
One of the many curiosities of this particularly parlia-
mentary episode was that its purpose was not particu-
larly well-defined. The wording of the amendment which
brought it about was,
“... and, given the need for the House to debate and
vote on alternative ways forward, with a view to the
Government putting forward a plan for the House
to debate and vote on, orders that Standing Order
No. 14(1) (which provides that government busi-
ness shall have precedence at every sitting save as
provided in that order) shall not apply on Wednes-
day 27 March...”18
Most of the procedural fluff that followed concerned itself
with obviating the government’s attempts to thwart the
exercise taking place at all.19 In the event some candidate
reached a majority, and that motion carried, it would not
have had any particular legal force. Presumably it would
also have been possible for multiple amendments to pass,
which would have been even more interesting.
Although no candidate obtained a majority, the indica-
tive votes still managed to produce a fascinating situation
where, in the immediate aftermath, different politicians
and pundits identified different candidates as the winner.
Surely the winner was the candidate which obtained the
most votes aye? Or perhaps it was the one which proved
the most palatable, with the fewest votes no? Or instead
was it the one which commanded the largest majority
for aye over no?20 Delicious. Of course in reality, if push
came to shove in a standard parliamentary vote, the large
number of abstentees could (and probably would) triv-
ially defeat any single candidate.
Only two things can end the Brexit saga. The first
scenario is that somehow21 the legal default of “No Deal”
occurs. The second is that a majority for one of the other
options is forced. This might happen when the dark-
horse of “Revoke Article 50” goes head-to-head against
“No Deal” at the 11th hour. This concept of two options
being run against each other directly was mentioned in
the previous section. We shall now consider it explicitly
by constructing the required candidate-orderings (known
as ordinal ballots) from our logical MPs. That is to say
we will use the results of the cardinal voting to predict
result of an ordinal vote.
A. The Condorcet Process
For a particular hardness set, it is possible to simu-
late the result of a 1-on-1 contest between two options
by assigning each MP to the candidate who is closest to
their position on the Brexit axis. We will not allow ab-
stentions, though they can clearly affect the result (this
is the No Show Paradox,22 more on this in a moment).
The outcomes of our electoral equivalent of trial by com-
bat for our two hardness sets are shown in Table III. In
the original set, “Norway+” emerges as the Condorcet
winner. In the optimised set, the victor is “Customs
Union”. Thankfully neither produce a tie. This is only
a simulation, but what it does show is that positions di-
rectly adjacent to “May’s Deal” on the Brexit axis are
not only more popular, but are popular enough to actu-
ally be able to defeat every single other candidate. The
tables are also useful in that they predict the result of
any particular head-to-head one wished to focus on, as
in the ‘Revoke Article 50” vs. “No Deal” example: “Re-
voke Article 50” won narrowly for the original set, and
more convincingly with the optimised set.
\ B O H Z D J K M L Wins
B 0 60 71 141 186 215 268 290 304 0
O 577 0 98 173 190 232 280 299 323 2
H 566 539 0 190 232 280 299 323 359 4
Z 496 464 447 0 280 299 323 359 443 6
D 451 447 405 357 0 323 359 443 538 8
J 422 405 357 338 314 0 443 538 603 7
K 369 357 338 314 278 194 0 603 620 5
M 347 338 314 278 194 99 34 0 623 3
L 333 314 278 194 99 34 17 14 0 1
\ B O H D Z J M K L Wins
B 0 12 67 70 120 142 172 178 192 0
O 625 0 97 178 186 192 219 223 248 1
H 570 540 0 190 193 212 244 246 286 2
D 567 459 447 0 248 254 307 319 432 5
Z 517 451 444 389 0 291 323 388 527 7
J 495 445 425 383 346 0 387 447 582 8
M 465 418 393 330 314 250 0 563 623 6
K 459 414 391 318 249 190 74 0 637 4
L 445 389 351 205 110 55 14 0 0 3
TABLE III. This is to be read as, ‘Row [letter1] won→ votes
against ↑ column [letter2]. Top: Condorcet election simu-
lated using the MPs’ mean score under the original hardness
set to construct their ordinal ballots. D≡“Norway+” is the
Condorcet winner. Bottom: Condorcet election simulated
using the MPs’ mean score under the optimised hardness set
to construct their ordinal ballots. J≡“Customs Union” is the
Condorcet winner.
It would be beyond exciting to see this sort of vote
implemented in the House of Commons. However a word
of warning. Our logical MPs both vote sincerely and fill
out their entire ballot. One could instead vote tactically,
either by abstaining to vote or, more likely, attempt to
defeat other candidates that one considered contenders.
This is known as burying. For example, in Table III,
top, D beats J overall. Large numbers of J voters could
vote for Z ahead of D even though this contrary to their
sincere preference. If Z beats D then J ties for first place
with Z, instead of coming second! One could imagine
tactical voting being especially effective (and exciting) in
such a small electorate where the preferences of the other
electors can be fairly accurately gauged. Game theory
will then ensue. The resistance to this sort of tactical
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voting is the subject of some amount of literature which
I am not able to penetrate with any success at this point.
Nevertheless, as far as I can tell, this sort of vulnerability
is brought about by the Condorcet process not fulfilling
the later-no-harm criterion. That is to say exactly the
D–J–Z situation described above. However, there exist
other voting systems which do not exhibit this particular
flaw.
B. Instant Runoff
If you are interested in a poorly thought-out referen-
dum on a complex issue with corrupt financing, mislead-
ing claims and/or promises, and an ultimate motivation
to maintain a Conservative majority, then what better
topic than Alternative Vote! If there was one issue that
I do not recall being extensively debated in that referen-
dum campaign, it was that Alternative Vote (AV) does
not necessarily select the Condorcet winner, as described
above. However, it does fulfil the later-no-harm criterion.
More on that in just a moment.
For those who do not remember, or weren’t paying at-
tention at the time, in AV one ranks the candidates in
order of preference. The ballots are then counted and the
candidate with the fewest top-choice votes is eliminated.
The count is then performed iteratively, with the elimi-
nated candidate deleted from everyone’s ballots. Such an
order of preferences can be constructed from these data
in the same way as for the Condorcet process, we can
then simulate the result of the candidates contesting an
AV election. This process always returns a winner. If
it could be agreed upon, it would therefore be able to
bring about a definitive end to the Brexit debate. In the
original set, we found that “Customs Union” defeated
“Norway” in the final round with a majority of 57; for
the optimised set, “Public Vote” defeated “Norway” in
the final round with a much larger majority of 149, see
Fig. 10.
Can this process also be manipulated by tactical vot-
ing? The answer is yes, to this and in fact to all de-
terministic voting systems you could possibly conceive
by something known as the Gibbard–Satterthwaite the-
orem! A description is particularly relevant if “Public
Vote” were to win. If a second referendum were to be con-
ducted, everyone has a different idea about what would
be on the ballot. Certainly, if the ballot read “No Deal”,
“May’s Deal”, “Revoke Article 50”, it could be consid-
ered rather unfair! Since the Leave vote, which had only
a small majority, would be divided between the first two
and “Revoke Article 50” would cruise to victory. This
is a generic weakness of plurality voting which leads to
the sort of tactical voting we see in UK general elections.
It is logical, therefore, for a referendum between these 3
options to be subject to runoff. This would not ‘split’ the
Leave vote in the sense that it would correctly be able
to represent the order of preferences of each individual.
However, it suffers from a violation of what is known as
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Round
0
200
400
V
ot
es
57
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Round
0
200
400
V
ot
es
149
FIG. 10. Top: Alternative Vote simulated using the MPs’
mean score under the original hardness set to construct their
ordinal ballots. “Customs Union” beats the Brexiteer can-
didate of “Norway” after “Customs Union+” is knocked out
in the penultimate round. “May’s Deal” comes fourth. Bot-
tom: Alternative Vote simulated using the MPs’ mean score
under the optimised hardness set to construct their ordinal
ballots. “Public Vote” trounces “Norway” after the defeat
of “Customs Union”. The three had been neck-and-neck for
some time. “May’s Deal” comes 7th.
the monotonicity criterion. This is in a sense a more ex-
treme example of the later-no-harm criterion, because it
requires you to not vote for your preference first. This is
best explained with an example.
1) Firstly we consider a sincere vote. In the first
round “Revoke Article 50” comes top, as it would
in a single-round plurality voting process. “May’s
Deal” comes last, and the votes are redistributed.
Not enough of the “May’s Deal” vote transfers to
“No Deal”, so “Revoke Article 50” still wins. This
would not be the Condorcet winner, since in a
straight fight “Revoke Article 50” would lose to
“May’s Deal”. This can be exploited.
2) Now consider a tactical vote. “No Deal” conspira-
tors have foreseen the outcome in the sincere sce-
nario, of course. Determined to stop Remain at
any cost, they raise “May’s Deal” to the top of
their ballots. “Revoke Article 50” still wins in the
first round. However, when “No Deal” now loses
instead as result of the conspirators’ actions, their
votes redistribute to “May’s Deal”. The head-to-
head results in “May’s Deal” winning.
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This strategy is known as compromise. It was never
possible for the “No Deal” conspirators to win, and so
they spited their nemesis by voting for some 3rd option.
This seems like a perfectly reasonable thing to do, since
the benefactor of your tactic is not yourself. It is effec-
tively what occurred in the 3rd vote on “May’s Deal” in
the Commons. However, for other groups, or in other
electorates, the strategy can actually elect your own can-
didate at the end. This is then termed pushover. A
slightly convoluted example of this in the current elec-
torate:
3) Return to the second example with the compromise
victory. The “Revoke Article 50” camp predict this
eventuality and seek to thwart it. They know that
“No Deal” will lose to them, i.e. it is a weak can-
didate, a ‘pushover’. Thus, in the first round they
raise “No Deal” to the top of their ballots, can-
celling out the defection of the “No Deal” conspir-
ators to “May’s Deal” and ensuring “No Deal” still
comes second. The final result is then the same as
in the first case, and “Revoke Article 50” wins in
spite of people expressly reducing the position of it
on their ballots. “No Deal” should be an irrelevant
alternative, but its position in the ballot turns out
to influence the result between the two ‘relevant’
competitors.
If that’s a bit too much of a train-wreck of gambits
for the reader to entertain, one can instead consider
that the “Revoke Article 50” camp merely believe
that “No Deal” is set to come last. The mechan-
ics are the same, except, of course, that as a result
of their very attempt to manipulate the election to
their advantage, “No Deal” could be elected acci-
dentally! This element of risk is a defence against
vote-manipulation based on the non-monotonic be-
haviour of AV, as the process threatens to descend
into a glorified game of rock-paper-scissors.
While we are considering hypothetical runoff ballots, it
is worth exploring something called Coombs’ Rule. This
is back-to-front AV in which the most least-popular can-
didate is eliminated in each round, instead of the least
most-popular. The winner is therefore the candidate
who the least people do not want, as opposed to the
one most people actively want. Recall that it was men-
tioned that some pundits claimed their preferred option
had won on those grounds? Well this is a method to
find the true candidate which fulfils that property. The
process shares many of the same properties as AV, an
analysis of which is available.23 In the original set, “Nor-
way+” defeats “Customs Union” in the final round with
a majority of 21; in the optimised set, “Customs Union”
defeats “May’s Deal” in the final round with a majority
of 55, see Fig. 11. It is worth noting that in this case, the
Coombs’ Rule produces the Condorcet winner. Indeed,
one can imagine that burying would be a good tactical
strategy on this sort of ballot. In these two areas it is
more similar to Condorcet than to AV.
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FIG. 11. The number of last-place nominations is displayed
at each stage as a number of negative votes. After being
eliminated, candidates are displayed with -600 votes. Top:
Coombs Rule simulated using the MPs’ mean score under the
original hardness set to construct their ordinal ballots. “Nor-
way+” narrowly defeats “Customs Union”. “May’s Deal”
comes third. Bottom: Coombs Rule simulated using the
MPs’ mean score under the optimised hardness set to con-
struct their ordinal ballots. “Customs Union” defeats “May’s
Deal” after it narrowly avoids elimination to “Public Vote”.
The behaviour is considerably more interesting.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have constructed a 2D representation
of MPs’ attitudes. From these data we have conceived of
a self consistent procedure that used Monte Carlo sam-
pling to define an ‘objective’ hardness set for the candi-
date policies. One such set was considered in the analysis
that followed. This set appealed due to its: clustering of
options perceived as similar, expression of the polarized
nature of the debate, the fact that Labour’s behaviour
is to some degree motived by partisan tendencies rather
than preferences. In the final section we hypothesised
on what the results of three kinds of ordinal ballot would
have been, if they had been carried out. Both the original
set and the optimised set were compared. Interestingly, a
pure Condorcet process returned a winner in both cases.
This is probably a result of the logical MPs being un-
able to express cyclical preferences, though (and this is
really weird) that does not ensure the aggregate prefer-
ences are not cyclical.24 In the case of the optimised set,
the Coombs Rule produced the Condorcet winner.
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How does this help inform the debate? Ultimately,
Mrs. May’s chosen deal will receive more votes than pre-
dicted in Sec. III, as it did on her third attempt (the day
after the indicative votes, Fig. 12). This is partly owing
to her use of the whip, and partly her threat to parlia-
ment that if the vote should not pass, the alternative
might be worse. In some sense, this is equivalent to run-
ning “May’s Deal” against whatever the threat was (“No
Deal” in the first two cases, and perhaps “Revoke Arti-
cle 50” in the third case) in a head-to-head. Of course,
the effectiveness then depends on the credibility of that
threat, which we could perhaps address using the logical
MPs. This could constitute an interesting extension. In
any case, the thrust of the argument is that the govern-
ment’s chosen position is privileged. Since “Norway+”
and “Customs Union” (the neighbouring candidates for
the two sets we considered, respectively) were found to
be both the Condorcet and Coombs winners, it follows
that the Prime Minister need only move a small amount
from her current position in order to carry a large ma-
jority. This will, of course, involve crossing at least one
of her ‘red lines’. What these results show with absolute
conviction, however, is that they must indeed be crossed.
Only policies which do this are able to result in victory
under this model. None of the conceived ballots show
“May’s Deal” coming out on top, and all of the options
to the left of her (harder Brexits) do even worse. This is
ultimately a manifestation of the ‘Remain parliament’.
On an authorial note: I am unable to tell to what
extent the work presented in this paper represents a
methodological novelty. If it does, then the next step
would be to test it on data sets where both cardinal and
ordinal ballots were conducted in parallel. If it does not,
then the author would be enormously grateful if he could
be made aware of the relevant papers.
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Appendix A: Additional Figures
See overleaf for those figures mentioned in, but not
essential to, the main body of text.
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FIG. 12. Fig. 15 where MPs are coloured according to how they voted in the three votes on “May’s Deal”, ordered chronologically
from right to left. Light blue: aye, dark blue: no, pink: no vote recorded. We used data from the first two where there was a
perceived threat of “No Deal” in the paper.
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FIG. 13. Fig. 3 where only those who voted aye to the indicated motion are plotted. This is complimentary to Fig. 1. It stands
to reason that motions which display similar patterns should be clustered together in the optimised hardness set.
FIG. 14. Fig. 3 colour coded according to stance taken
in the 2016 referendum. Dark blue: Leave, light blue:
Remain, lilac: was not an MP at the time or did not
publically declare. The data show firstly that parliament
has a large majority of Remain supporters, and secondly
that the most Leave supporters cluster around the left-
most extreme.
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FIG. 15. Original data without the inclusion of the votes
on “May’s Deal”. Those who voted no to everything are
below the axes. Huw Merriman is still not being dis-
played for clarity (he has an even larger variance than
in the text). The cluster just to the right of center with
a high variance are those who abstained on all options:
the Cabinet, the Speaker’s office, Sinn Fe´in, and one SNP
MP.
